Sunday, April 28, 2019

Reyes v CA

G.R. No. 94214. December 1, 1992
Art. 1338 – Fraud.

Petitioners – Consuelo Reyes, Mario Francisco & Marila Berceño
Respondents – CA, Jose Ortañez & Angel Aseoche.

Facts:
·         The subject of this controversy is a 4-unit apartment building located at Sampaloc, Manila, owned by Jose Ortañez.
·         Ortañez leased separately the units to the three petitioners and Angel Aseoche.
·         In 1980, Ortañez offered to sell the building to the said lessees for P150,000.00 and gave them 30 days within which to reply. But only Reyes and Aseoche indicated their interest in purchasing the units they were respectively occupying. The other two petitioners did not respond.
·         Reyes did not pursue her intention to purchase her unit. Aseoche negotiated with Ortañez, and was offered the option to buy the entire building.
·         Thereafter, Aseoche notified the petitioners in writing that he was now the owner of the whole building. Later, he told them to vacate their respective units within 90 days because the premises would be occupied by his son, brother and sister.
·         The petitioners filed a complaint against Aseoche and Ortañez for Annulment of Title/ Sale with Damages, later amended to include a prayer for Specific Performance.
·         The trial court rendered its decision on their favor, but was reversed by the CA.
·         The petitioners asserted that the sale between Aseoche and Ortañez was tainted with fraud and bad faith, which called for nullification.

Issue:
          WoN the fraud that vitiates a contract invoked by the peitioners be the “fraud” contemplated by Art. 1338 of the Civil Code.

Held:
          No, the Court holds that the fraud or bad faith as a ground for nullifying the contract between Ortañez and Aseoche is NOT the fraud contemplated by the said provision because they are strangers to the contracting parties. Hence, the petitioners are not entitled to such invocation.
          Under Art. 1338, There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which without them he would not have agreed to.
          In the case at bar, there was no evidence that Aseoche resorted to insidious words or machinations to induce Ortañez to enter into a contract with him, which constituted fraud. Moreover, the petitioners failed to establish that they authorized Aseoche to represent them in their negotiation. It is clear, however, that the petitioners decided to challenge the sale between the private respondents only because and after they were asked to vacate the subject property although they had not earlier manifested or pursued any interest in buying it when it was formally offered for sale to them.
          Thus, the petition is DENIED.

Heinzrich Theis v CA

G.R. No. 126013. February 12, 1997
Art. 1331 – When mistake may invalidate the contract.
Art. 1390 – Voidable contracts.

Petitioners – Heinzrich Theis &  Betty Theis
Respondents – CA, RTC & Calsons Development Corp.

Facts:
·         Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent parcels of land in Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no.3 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no.4, which was not owned by the CDC.
·         CDC constructed a two-storey house on parcel no.3, while parcel no. 1 and parcel no.2 remained idle.
·         However, an erroneous survey indicated the interchange of Transfer Certificate of Titles of the said properties, where parcel no.3 was erroneously located in parcel no.1 and the two idle lands in parcel.4.
·         Unaware of the mistake, CDC sold to the Theis parcel no.4 through the Deed of Sale. Thereafter, the Theis did not immediately occupy and take possession of the two (2) idle parcels of land because they went to Germany.
·         They went back to the Philippines and look over the vacant lots in Tagaytay to plan the construction of their house thereon. But they discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3, where a two-storey house was constructed.
·         The Theis insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, but CDC argued that it could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did not own parcel no. 4 in the first place.
·         To remedy the mistake, offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 as these two were precisely the two vacant lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction with petitioners.
·         The Theis rejected the good faith offer and refused to yield to reason, and insisted on taking parcel no. 3 upon which a two-storey house stands, in addition to parcel no. 2.
·         Such refusal of the Theis prompted CDC to make another offer, i.e. the return of an amount double the price paid by the former. But they still refused and stubbornly insisted in their stand.
·         CDC filed an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof.
·         The trial court rendered judgment in favor of CDC on the ground of mistake in the identification of the parcels of land intended to be the subject matter of said sale. The CA affirmed the said decision in toto.

Issue:
          WoN a contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was procured by mistake.

Held:
          Yes, the Court holds that where consent is given through mistake, the validity of the contractual relations between the parties is legally impaired. Hence, the contract can be annulled.
Under Art. 1331, in order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.
In the case at bar, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed by the CDC in selling parcel no. 4 to the Theis falls within the said provision. Verily, such mistake invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper.

“Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(a)  x x x
(b)  Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. 
x x x”
In the case at bar, CDC obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, it is quite impossible for CDC to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good faith of the CDC is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the Theis or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the CDC with no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.

          Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.

Vasquez v CA

G.R. No. 83759. July 12, 1991
Art. 1324 – When offer may be withdrawn.

Petitioner – Sps. Cipriano Vasquez & Valeriano Gayanelo
Respondents – CA, Sps. Martin Vallejera & Apolonia Olea

Petitioner – Sps. Cipriano Vasquez & Valeriano Gayanelo
Respondents – CA, Sps. Martin Vallejera & Apolonia Olea

Facts:
·         In 1959, Vallejera leased the lot in question to Vaquez.
·         In 1964, they sold it to the Vasquez through Deed of Sale for the amount of P9,000.00. Along with the execution of the Deed of Sale, a separate instrument of Right to Repurchase was executed by the parties granting Vallejera the right to repurchase the said lot for P12,000.00.
·         But in 1969, Vallejera sold the same lot to another buyer for the sum of P12,000.00. Vasquez protested and effected the cancellation of the second sale after he paid the second buyer of P12,000.00.
·         In 1975, Sps. Vallejera filed an action against the Sps. Vasquez to redeem a parcel of land of the Himamaylan Cadastre, which was previously sold by Vallejera to Vasquez.
·         Vasquez resisted this action for redemption on the premise that the Right to Repurchase is just an option to buy since it is not embodied in the same document of sale but in a separate document, and since such option is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price, said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them.
·         The trial court rendered judgement against the Vasquez, ordering them to resell the questioned lot to the Vallejera for the repurchase price of P24,000.00. It was affirmed by the CA.
·         But Vasquez insisted that they cannot be compelled to resell the said lot because the nature of the sale was that of an absolute deed of sale and that the right to repurchase can only be either an option to buy or a mere promise on their part to resell the property.

Issue:
          WoN there is evidence showing that the petitioner accepted the right to repurchase the land in question in order for them to resell the property.

Held:
          No, the Court holds that Vasquez did not accepted the “Right to Repurchase” the land in question as evidenced by the record.
          Under Art. 1324, when the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised.
          In the case at bar, the annotation and registration of the right to repurchase at the back of the certificate of title of the Vasquez cannot be considered as acceptance of the right to repurchase. It only served as notice of the existence of such unilateral promise of the petitioners to resell the same to the Vallejera.
Neither can the signature of the Vasquez in the document called “right to repurchase” signify acceptance of the right to repurchase. Acceptance should be made by the promisee, Vallejera, and not the promisors, Vasquez. But Vallejera did not sign the offer. Furthermore, the actions of Vallejera, i.e. filing a complaint to compel re-sale and their demands for resale prior to filing of the complaint, cannot be considered acceptance.
          Thus, the petition is GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint filed by Vallejera in CFI Negros Occidental is DISMISSED.

The City of Cebu v Dedamo

G.R. No. 142971. May 7, 2002
Art. 1315 – Contracts perfected by mere consent.
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 - Just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.


Petitioner – The City of Cebu
Respondents –Sps. Apolonio & Blasa Dedamo

Facts:
·         The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against the spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, alleging that it needed their two parcels of land for a public purpose, i.e. for the construction of a public road.
·         The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400.
·         The City of Cebu deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
·         Dedamo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because of the following reasons:
(a)  That the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for public use, but for benefit of a single private entity;
(b)  That the price offered was very low; and
(c)  That they have no other land in Cebu City.
·         A pre-trial ensued, but the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement to partially settle the case.
·         Thereafter, the trial court directed the City of Cebu to pay the Dedamo the just compensation of P24,865,930.00 based on the recommendation of the appointed commissioners. But the said compensation was amended to P20,826,339.50, excluding an area which was not subject to expropriation.
·         The City of Cebu elevated the case to the CA, asserting that the value of just compensation should be based on the date of the filing of the complaint. But the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
            WoN just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
            No, the Court holds that just compensation shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property in accordance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, a substantive law that must prevail over procedural law.
            Under Art. 1315 also, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
            In the case at bar, the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. Since the petitioner did not interpose a serious objection during the hearing, it is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation.
            Thus, the petition is DENIED.

Friday, April 19, 2019

Saladaga v Astorga


A.C. No. 4697. November 25, 2014
Legal Ethics; Canon 1; Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Facts:
Complainant Saldaga and respondent Atty. Astorga entered into a deed of sale with right to repurchase on December 2, 1981. Atty. Astorga sold to the complainant a parcel of coconut land located in Baybay, Leyte for 15,000.00. Under the deed, Saldaga represented that it has “the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple” the subject property, and that the property is “free from all liens and encumbrances”. The deed also provided that Atty. Astorga, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased, “the parties shall renew the instrument or agreement”. 

Atty. Astorga failed to exercise his right to repurchase within the period stipulated in the deed, and no renewal of contract was made when Saldaga made a final demand. Saldaga remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989, he received letters from Rural Bank of Albuera  (Leyte) informing him that the property is mortgaged by Atty. Astorga to it. That the bank had foreclosed the property and Saldaga should vacate the property.
Saldaga was dispossessed of the property, so it filed a case of estafa against the respondent.  The complainant likewise instituted an administrative case which was then referred to the IBP for  investigation, report  and  recommendation, where it found Atty. Astorga guilty of Bad Faith when he dealt with Saldaga misrepresenting him that the property was covered with TCT No. T-662 when the said TCT was  already  cancelled  earlier  and  transferred  to  her  wife’s  name  without  informing  Saldaga. It likewise held that Atty. Astorga shall be suspended from the practice of law for two years and ordered to return the sum of 15,000 with interest. 

Issue:
WoN the investigating commissioner correctly ruled that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and pay the corresponding amount.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative because when Atty. Astorga was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath to obey the laws, do no falsehood and uphold the constitution, as well as to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. This, in which he gravely violated his oath, when it caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase as he was the one who drafted or prepared such document. Respondent could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and refer himself and the complainant as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee”, rather than “vendor a retro” and “vendee a retro”, then the controversy could have been avoided. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed the lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath, to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. 
Indeed. respondent had the right to mortgage the property but as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that the agreement faithfully, clearly and expressly embody or reflect the intention of the parties. Otherwise, it will open the door to legal disputes which in the case at bar was caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase”. Which played a significant factor in the controversy.
            Likewise, the respondent dealt with the complainant with Bad Faith, Deceit and Fraud when he made it appear that property was covered with TCT-662 when it was in fact cancelled nine years earlier. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: 
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
          Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is “unlawful.”  “Unlawful” conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part. 
Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Castillo v Salvador


G.R. No. 191240. July 30, 2014
A petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of Estafa.

Facts:
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo was a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother, Ramon to engage in freight and remittance business.
As Castillo had deeply fallen in love with Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as Castillo was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
In his defense, Salvador denied all the facts alleged by Castillo, except that they became close friends and eventually fell in love and had an affair. He admitted that they traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok, but denied that Castillo gave him US$100,000.00 during that trip for the purpose of said business.  The amount he received from her was in turn given to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. That upon his return to the Philippines, Castillo never asked him about the business, as she never gave him such amount. They went to Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he gave her P600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips
Castillo filed the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case, arguing that even if the Court Of Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to her.

Issue:
WON the award of damages of the civil aspect be retained.

Held:
No, the award of damages must be removed. 
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence. The petition for the award of damages is denied.

Valencia Hardwood v CA


G.R. No. 102316. June 30, 1997
Art. 1306 – The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions NOT contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

Facts:
·         Plaintiff Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. entered into an agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation, whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.
·         Valenzuela insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 and the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00.
·         Valenzuela tendered a check as payment for premium on the insurance policy. The following day MV Seven Ambassador sank.
·         A check for P5,625.00 to cover payment of the premium and documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered due to the insurer, but was not accepted. Instead, the South Sea Surety cancelled the insurance policy it issued as of the date of the inception for non-payment of the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
·         Valenzuela filed formal claims against South Sea Surety and Seven Brothers.

Issue:
WoN the contract of private carriage entered by the Valenzuela Hardwood with Seven Brothers is valid within the purview of Article 1306 of the New Civil Code.

Held:
Yes, the Court holds that the parties are at liberty to establish stipulations in their contract provided that they are not divergent to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The court stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.

Montecillo v Reynes

G.R. No.138018. July 26, 2002
Art. 1318 - Requisites of Contract

Facts:
·         Respondents Ignacia Reynes and Spouses Abucay filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and Quieting of Title against petitioner Rido Montecillo.
·         Reynes signed a Deed of Sale in favor to Montecillo in consideration for P47,000.00 purchase price payable within one month from the signing of the Deed of Sale.
·         Reynes further alleged that Montecillo failed to pay the purchase price after the lapse of the one-month period, prompting Reynes to demand from Montecillo the return of the Deed of Sale. Since Montecillo refused to return the Deed of Sale, Reynes executed a document unilaterally revoking the sale and gave a copy of the document to Montecillo.
·         Subsequently, Reynes signed a Deed of Sale transferring to the Abucay Spouses the entire Mabolo Lot, at the same time confirming the previous sale of a 185-square meter portion of the lot.
·         Respondents, receiving  information that the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo for the Mabolo Lot, argued that “for lack of consideration there was no meeting of the minds” between Reynes and Montecillo. Thus, the trial court should declare null and void ab initio Montecillo’s Deed of Sale, and order the cancellation of Certificate of Title in the name of Montecillo.

Issue:
WoN the failure of Montecillo to pay the 47,000 as consideration for the lot prevented the existence of the contract.

Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court holds that the failure of Montecillo to pay the purchase price of the lot ceases the contract to exist.
Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, “there is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.”
Where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid for lack of consideration. This has been the well-settled rule as early as Ocejo Perez & Co. v. Flores:
In that case at bar, the agreed purchase price in consideration of the lot in questioned has in fact never been paid by Monticillo to the Reyes. Hence, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio as such a sale is non-existent or cannot be considered consummated.
           Thus, the petition is DENIED.