Castillo v Salvador

G.R. No. 191240. July 30, 2014

A petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of Estafa.

Facts:

The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo was a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother, Ramon to engage in freight and remittance business.

As Castillo had deeply fallen in love with Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.

The business has not operated yet as Castillo was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

In his defense, Salvador denied all the facts alleged by Castillo, except that they became close friends and eventually fell in love and had an affair. He admitted that they traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok, but denied that Castillo gave him US$100,000.00 during that trip for the purpose of said business.  The amount he received from her was in turn given to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. That upon his return to the Philippines, Castillo never asked him about the business, as she never gave him such amount. They went to Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he gave her P600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips

Castillo filed the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case, arguing that even if the Court Of Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to her.

Issue:

WON the award of damages of the civil aspect be retained.

Held:

No, the award of damages must be removed. 

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence. The petition for the award of damages is denied.

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989
Art. 15 - Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.

Issue:

WoN the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.

Held:

            The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is admitted. 
             According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case as the offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent.

Aznar v Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.

Facts:

             Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

         In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the  Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

           WoN Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

           The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1.   The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2.   The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.

           Thus, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Guy v CA

G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006

Facts:

Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents alleged that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate of P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Respondents are a asking for an appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special Administrator of the Estate. Petitioner is praying for the dismissal of the petition for the reason that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration. He argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

Issues:

1. WoN private respondent’s petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with rules on non-forum shopping?

2. WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their Successional Rights?

3. WoN private respondents are barred by prescription from proving filiation?

Held:

1. Yes, the petition lacks merit. The law provides that certification of non-forum should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply means cause for a dismissal of the case. Merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate rule with impunity should be considered to temper the strict application of the rules.

2. Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, waiver must be couched clearly and in unequivocal terms to leave no doubt with regards to the intention of a party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be attributed to a person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces intent to abandon a right. This case has no waiver of hereditary rights.

3. Private respondents must not be barred from proving filiation because the law provides that filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission by means of a public document or a private handwritten instrument. Action for recognition may be brought by the child during his/her lifetime. However, action must be based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.

De Roy v CA

G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988
Art. 2, CC - Effectivity of the law

Facts:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal,Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so. 

Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed into by the Court of Appeals. 

On the last day of the 15-dayperiod to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void the previous decision and claimed that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. 

They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.

Issue:

WoN the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to the case at bar.

Held:

The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar, notwithstanding the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.

        There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

           The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending in the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion may grant or deny the extension requested. Such decision was given prospective application to subsequent cases like Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.

In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Petitioner: Honorato Catindig

Re: The petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC Malolos, Bulacan.

Art. 364-380 - Use of surname is fixed by law

Facts:

·         In Aug. 2000, Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.

·         He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia” (her mother’s surname), and that her surname Garcia to “Catindig” (his surname).

·         In Mar. 2001, the trial court granted his petition, thereby freeing Stephanie from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir.  Pursuant to Article 189 of the FC, the minor shall be known as “Stephanie Nathy Catindig”.

·         In Apr. 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration, praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother “Garcia” as her middle name.

·         In May 2001, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that there is no law allowing an adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.

Issue:

       WoN an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

Held:

         Yes, since there is no law also prohibiting Stephanie, being an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, to use her mother’s name, the Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.  The child should be permitted to use “Garcia” as her middle name for the following reasons:

a.    Use of surname is fixed by law – Art. 364-380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted, married, previously married or a widow;

b.    Law is silent as to the use of middle name – There is no law regulating the use of a middle name, even the Art. 176 of the FC (as amended by RA 9255).  Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.  But as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the framers of the FC recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name as recorded in the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees.

c.    The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child – Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother.

d.            Liberal construction of adoption statues in favor of adoption – It is a settled rule that adoption statues should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.  The interests and welfare of the adopted child are primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.  The Art. 10 of the CC provides a necessary scale in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure.

          Hence, the Court grants the petition and partly modifies the assailed decision, allowing Stephanie to use her mother’s surname “Garcia” as her middle name.